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Preface 
We hope that this book will make a contribution to practice as well as to 
scholarship. The book was made possible by the international research net-
work of the Labor and Employment Relations Association's Airline Industry 
Council, and in particular by an excellent group of academic colleagues 
from around the world. We draw on the work of many of them in the book 
including Michael Barry, Phil Beaumont, Seong-Jae Cho, Geraint Harvey, 
Laurie Hunter, Byung-Sik Kang, Nancy Brown Johnson, Russell Lansbury, 
Byoung-Hoon Lee, Robert McKersie, Werner Nienhueser, Sarah Oxen-
bridge, Judy Pate, Teresa Shuk-Ching Poon, Daphne Taras, Siobhan Tier-
nan, Peter Turnbull, Joe Wallace, Peter Waring, Lorraine White, Clare Yaz-
beck, and their colleagues. A series of articles from this network will be 
published in the International Journal of Human Resource Management in 
2009. 
We are grateful to the practitioners of the Airline Industry Council who 
have provided data for and feedback on our work including Phillip Corn-
stock, Robert DeLucia, Pat Friend, Jerry Glass, Arthur Luby, Bernhard 
Rikardsen, Seth Rosen, and Steve Sleigh. We are also grateful to our col-
leagues in the MIT Global Airline Industry Program including Arnold Bar-
nett, Cynthia Barnhart, Peter Belobaba, John Hansman, James Lee, Amedeo 
Odoni, Bill Swelbar, and Gerry Tsoukalis who provided data, analysis, in-
sights, and feedback on our ideas. 
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Up in the Air 
CHAPTER 1 
Low-Cost Competition 
in the Airline Industry 
These words from a front-page story in the December 22, 2007, issue of the 
New York Times should serve as a wake-up call to all those responsible for 
America's air transportation system: "And you thought the passengers were 
mad. . . . Airline employees are fed up, too—with pay cuts, increased work-
loads and management's miserly ways, which leave workers to explain to 
often-enraged passengers why flying has become such a miserable experi-
ence."1 The story goes on to report comments from US Airways' employees 
in a question-and-answer session with their chief executive officer. The em-
ployees' frustrations came through loud and clear about working for the air-
line with the most passenger complaints and mishandled bags and the lowest 
rate of on-time arrivals: 
"I hate to tell you but the interiors of our planes smell bad and they are filthy. 
As an employee I am embarrassed to admit working for US Airways." 
"How long do you think the airline will be around the way it's running 
right now?" 
Something is fundamentally wrong when both an industry's workforce 
and customers report high and rising frustration with the way they are being 
treated. Can't the industry do better than this? Is it too much to expect the 
airline industry, or any other industry for that matter, to provide a fair return 
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to investors, high quality and reliable service to their customers, and good 
jobs for their employees? Measured against these three expectations, US 
Airways is not alone. The U.S. airline industry is failing. In the first five 
years of the twenty-first century, U.S. airlines lost $30 billion. Four of the 
largest airlines wiped out their equity investors by going into bankruptcy. In 
2008, there were only a few airlines in the world other than those owned by 
governments whose debt ratings put them above junk bond status. These few 
included Southwest, Qantas, and Lufthansa. In those five years, U.S. airlines 
also cut wages by more than $15 billion and laid off one hundred thousand 
workers. Worker morale fell to all-time low levels. And customer complaints 
rose to record levels as companies cut the number of flights to fill planes and 
cut services and frills to save money. With all of this, as well as aging air traf-
fic control technologies, labor problems with and shortages of air traffic 
controllers, and increased congestion and flight delays, industry commenta-
tors in the United States and overseas have expressed worries that a "perfect 
storm" may be coming.2 
Is all of this the unavoidable consequence of the 9/11 attacks on New York 
and Washington, D.C.? To some extent, yes. The sharp drop in air travel af-
ter 9/11 made one-time losses and cutbacks inevitable. But it's more than 
that. This upheaval of losses, layoffs, wage cuts, and bankruptcies echoes 
previous periods in the early 1980s and early 1990s, highlighting the volatile 
nature of the industry. Booms are followed by contentious battles about 
wage increases, which are then followed by busts, accompanied by wrench-
ing episodes of restructuring and concessions, which are followed by booms, 
as the cycle starts again. By 2006, as some U.S. airlines began to eke out 
modest profits, employees once again began raising their voices, asking for 
their fair share of whatever gains might be ahead—and the increasingly 
volatile up-and-down cycle of the industry seems destined to be repeated. 
In each downturn, though, three important stakeholders suffer. Investors 
lose as company valuations drop and in some cases disappear. Employees, 
who have substantial firm-specific human capital, especially in an industry 
such as airlines in which compensation is often linked to firm-specific se-
niority, obviously suffer from layoffs and cuts to pay or other benefits. Cus-
tomers suffer much-degraded service levels, as airlines cut back on ameni-
ties and delay needed investments in equipment and terminals, and as 
employees become more and more demoralized. 
Yet the most recent upheaval reflects more than just another round of 
volatility. It also reflects a surge of new entrants that have spread price com-
petition to an unprecedented degree. Around the world, the airline industry 
Low-Cost Competition in the Airline Industry 3 
is becoming increasingly competitive as markets are deregulated and new 
entrants with low costs offer low fares. As a consequence, the industry is in-
creasingly driven by cost-cutting pressures. This trend began in the United 
States after deregulation in the late 1970s; new-entrant low-cost competitors 
have played an increasing role since the 1990s and have continued to gain 
market share. They are growing even faster elsewhere in the world. 
The annual number of miles flown by all passengers has grown by nearly 
200 percent in the United States since deregulation, while the cost per mile 
has fallen by half, a growth rate and price performance that is not matched 
by any other relatively "mature" industry. In short, among the stakeholders 
in the airline industry, customers, especially customers in search of low prices, 
have been the winners. So if judged solely against the criterion of providing 
access for more consumers at low prices, airline deregulation would be 
judged a success. This is important. But while good for consumers' budgets, 
does increasing price competition necessarily mean negative consequences 
for investors and employees—and for the service quality that customers ex-
perience? Do low fares inevitably mean low-quality jobs? Is volatility a fact 
of life based on the industry's underlying characteristics? More ominously, 
will the degradation in human capital caused by lower and more volatile in-
comes, job security, and morale, along with the increased outsourcing of 
maintenance and other services, raise concerns about future safety? Are the 
risks of some type of meltdown in America's air transportation system in-
creasing? Or, can we fashion a more sustainable, less volatile industry that 
better balances the objectives of customers, investors, employees, and the 
wider society? And does deregulation necessarily mean the abrogation of 
government's responsibility to oversee the industry, even as the industry 
shows clear signs of deterioration and an increasing risk of crisis? 
These are reasonable, indeed vital, questions that are too seldom asked. 
Instead, too many business leaders assume that achieving low costs must 
mean low wages and no unions. As one veteran airline executive put it 
when discussing the state of the industry, "It's all about price." Too many 
union leaders assume that adversarial win-lose relations are the only model 
for labor-management relations. And too many policymakers accept as an 
article of faith that an unregulated market in which companies compete 
autonomously with strategies chosen by executives who are trying to maxi-
mize shareholder value is the best way to build an economy in a global 
marketplace—and the only way to compete. But at least one highly re-
spected veteran airline industry executive, Robert Crandall, the former chief 
executive of American Airlines, believes the industry has suffered under the 
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watch of government leaders who have been paralyzed by their blind faith in 
laissez-faire ideology: 
There is no leadership at the federal level. We are in the grips of ideologues. 
We have had an administration that is convinced the market will solve the 
problem but the policies that make sense for the overall industry make no 
sense for the individual airlines and the policies that make sense for individual 
firms make no sense for the industry. . . . It is a classic case of needing sensible 
government regulation.'3 
The narrow views of business, labor, and government leaders tend to ig-
nore history, overlook important alternatives and variations, and suffer from 
a myopic, U.S.-centric view of the world. They forget that American policy-
makers found it necessary to introduce regulations to stabilize the airline 
industry in its early years so that the industry could expand in an orderly way 
to meet the nation's growing need for airline service. The same need for sta-
bility led policymakers to bring labor-management relations under the um-
brella of a transportation labor law that provided for mediation and other 
procedures to settle disputes without resort to strikes or other service dis-
ruptions and to allow wages to be taken out of competition. 
These views also overlook the considerable variation in strategies and 
practices in the U.S. airline industry. Hidden beneath the bleak results at 
the industry level are examples of individual airlines, both low-cost entrants 
and much older or so-called legacy airlines, that have pursued alternative 
employment practices and achieved more positive results for all of their 
stakeholders—low prices, high-quality service, profits, relatively good jobs, 
and less volatility. Two U.S. firms that will feature prominently in our analy-
sis, Southwest Airlines and Continental Airlines, consistently are found in the 
upper half of the service-quality rankings reported in table 1.1 and have been 
listed among the 100 best places to work by Fortune magazine. The question 
then becomes whether and how these examples can be emulated to achieve a 
better balance among stakeholders and reduce volatility across the industry. 
Some countries recognize they still have a national interest in balancing 
the interests of the multiple stakeholders needed to support a sustainable 
airline industry—one marked by fewer episodic crises and one that doesn't 
lurch from one extreme to another—even as they move toward greater de-
regulation and negotiate "open skies" agreements. Around the world there 
are debates about different "varieties of capitalism," with most Anglo-Saxon 
countries exemplifying a shareholder-maximizing model of a market econ-
•*-"4?3 
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Table 1 . 1 . Service quality comparisons across U.S. Airlines 
Southwest 
Alaska 
JetBlue 
Continental 
Northwest 
American 
Delta 
United 
US Airways 
Consumer Complaints 
0.3 
0.8 
0.8 
1.1 
1.5 
1.8 
1.9 
2.3 
3.4 
On-Time Arrivals 
80.4 
71.5 
69.3 
74.7 
69.7 
69.5 
76.9 
71.8 
68.0 
Mishandled Baggage 
6.0 
6.6 
5.8 
5.7 
5.1 
7.4 
7.7 
6.0 
8.8 
Note: Customer Complaints=complaints per 1,000 passengers, January-September, 2007. On Time 
Arrivals=Percent total on time arrivals, November 2006-October 2007. Mishandled Baggage=Reports 
per 1,000 passengers, January-September, 2007. 
Sources. Transportation Department and Bloomberg Financial Markets. Reprinted from Jeff Bailey, "Fliers 
Fed Up? The Employees Feel the Same," New York Times, December 22,2007. 
omy, while the Scandinavian and Germanic countries and Japan exemplify a 
more coordinated-market approach to governing their economies and to 
balancing the interests of different stakeholders.4 
There is much to learn from these variations between companies as well as 
countries. But our research demonstrates that too many airlines, unions, and 
policymakers have been slow and reluctant learners. This book is an effort to 
open up the learning process. We do so by considering the trends as new en-
trants and legacy airlines around the world increasingly compete on costs. We 
discuss findings from case studies of airlines in the United States and other 
countries, analyzing the competitive strategies and the employment-relations 
strategies that airlines have adopted in response to economic pressures, and 
evaluate the outcomes for customers, employees, and other stakeholders. In 
particular, we will try to understand the lessons offered by airlines whose 
managers, unions, and employees have pursued and achieved more construc-
tive relationships that reduce volatility, allow for quicker adaptation to changed 
conditions, and/or achieve low costs by providing good jobs that engage their 
workers. We conclude with recommendations for how the industry can better 
meet the needs of its multiple stakeholders. 
Why Are These Questions Important? 
One reason we should care about these issues goes to the heart of what citi-
zens in an economy and society should expect from an industry. Most citizens 
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are consumers and workers.5 As consumers we expect an industry to deliver 
good quality and safe products and services at affordable prices. And as 
workers we value good jobs that deliver on what some have called a social 
contract—hard work, loyalty, and good performance should be rewarded 
with dignity, good wages, and an opportunity to improve our economic secu-
rity over time. Employment relationships should achieve a balance between 
efficiency and equity at work and should respect employees' right to have a 
voice in shaping the terms and conditions under which they work.6 At a more 
macro level, the expectation is that wages and standards of living should 
improve approximately in tandem with growth in productivity and profitabil-
ity. This is the essence of the social contract that governed employment rela-
tions in the United States for decades following World War II." Wages and 
living standards did indeed rise in tandem with increases in productivity over 
that period. Unions and companies found ways to both enhance efficiency and 
to divide the fruits of their efforts in a more or less acceptable manner. This 
tandem movement began to erode in the 1970s and the erosion accelerated 
after 1980. Between 1980 and 2005, productivity grew by more than 70 per-
cent while real compensation levels for nonmanagerial workers remained flat. 
At the same time executive compensation increased greatly, growing from 
about twenty times the average worker's wages in the 1950s to between two 
hundred and four hundred times average wages in 2007. Few defend such an 
increase on either equity or efficiency grounds.8 The old social contract has 
broken down in the airline industry and more generally across other sectors of 
the American economy. Although changes in technology, markets, and the 
workforce make it impossible and perhaps even undesirable to return to the 
past, can a new social contract be fashioned, one better tailored to the contem-
porary economy and workforce? As employment-relations specialists, we see 
this as a critical challenge and responsibility facing the airline industry, labor, 
and government leaders. 
There is a second concern that we bring to this analysis. Most airlines are 
highly unionized in the United States and in many other countries. Research 
has demonstrated that many of the traditions and practices of collective bar-
gaining and labor relations that were developed during the twentieth cen-
tury should be changed to meet the different needs of workers, employers, 
and the political economy of the twenty-first century. Yet labor relations in 
the U.S airline industry, and in other countries as well, have been painfully 
slow to change. Some of the pain that has been endured by the workforce 
and the industry in recent years reflects the failures of earlier efforts to 
change on a more gradual and consistent basis. Thus, the parties need to 
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Low-Cost Competition in the Airline Industry 
learn from past failures (as well as successes) so that they can avoid repeating 
past mistakes. The evidence from the experiences of some parties shows 
there are better, more productive, and more satisfying ways to structure and 
govern employment relations in the airline industry. But it will take con-
certed and coordinated efforts from industry, labor, and government to lead 
the change process. 
Beyond these employment-relations concerns, there is another dimension 
to "why this is important," specific to the airline industry, namely, the exter-
nalities and centrality of airlines to most countries and their economies. 
Airlines are a key part of the transportation infrastructure in most countries. 
They are important to national and international security. They help gener-
ate and support at least four times the number of jobs beyond the direct 
workers of the airlines and are fundamental to the economic growth and vi-
tality of the communities they serve. Numerous jobs in other industries are 
facilitated by the direct jobs in airlines, including jobs in: airports, aero-
space, tourism, hotels and hospitality, retailing, car hire, security, and many 
other services. One analysis estimates, for example, that, on a global scale, 
approximately five million direct airline jobs generate nearly twenty-five mil-
lion jobs in other sectors. In the United States alone the approximately 
450,000 airline jobs are complemented by another four million jobs that to-
gether contribute $410 billion to the nations gross domestic product.9 A 
study of one airport (Houston) estimated that airlines and related services 
accounted for 151,000 local jobs and $24 billion in revenues for local 
businesses.10 
Airlines are also embedded in a larger aviation infrastructure that is paid 
for and supported to varying degrees by local and national governments—air 
traffic control systems, airports, ground transport, and other facilities. In 
many countries airlines were or continue to be subsidized directly by na-
tional governments and in some cases they serve as iconic sources of national 
pride. Even in countries such as the United States, with multiple large carri-
ers and an increasing number of new entrants where the possible demise of 
any single airline is likely to be offset by the growth or entry of others, the 
strength and sustained performance of the airline industry as a whole is of 
national concern. Thus, the strategies of individual airlines must be consid-
ered in the context of the sustainability of the industry nationally and 
globally. 
We will also explore a question and worry we hear increasingly around 
the world: Is the American model destined to be replicated elsewhere as 
other countries open their skies to increased international competition? Or 
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will the cultural and institutional differences between countries moderate 
how airlines compete, engage their employees, and serve their customers? 
Alternatively, will American firms be able to compete with airlines that offer 
higher quality services and/or are more heavily subsidized or protected by 
their home countries? 
The stakes are high and cover a wide range of concerns including the 
quality of employment relationships, the interests of national economies and 
societies, and the role of U.S. and international airlines in the global aviation 
industry. 
Our Analytical Framework 
Although the focus of our analysis is on the U.S. airline industry, we put the 
U.S. experience into a global context by drawing on the work of an interna-
tional network of researchers who have used a similar analytical framework 
in studying airlines in other countries. We acknowledge in the preface many 
research colleagues who have conducted studies of airlines based in Austra-
lia, Canada, Ireland, Germany, Korea, Malaysia, Scandinavia, and the United 
Kingdom.11 By taking such a comparative perspective we avoid presenting 
the issues raised here as just an American problem, or one limited to Ameri-
can options or solutions. Those responsible for regulating the airline industry 
and employment relationships in other countries can also benefit from these 
international comparisons and from a more careful look at variations among 
companies in the United States. The "American model" is neither as uniform 
as many assume nor the only way to govern an industry or its employment 
relationships. 
We approach the study of these issues by focusing on the variations in the 
national institutional contexts, firm-level business strategies, employment 
policies and practices, and the interconnections between these levels. None 
of these broad factors are the inevitable result of an "invisible hand" or de-
terministic force. The competitive environment, for example, is shaped by 
government policies and actions ranging from the degree and nature of com-
petition allowed among airlines to the security and safety rules governing 
operations, from labor and employment regulations to the actions of airlines 
and unions. Thus, we take what has been called a "strategic choice" perspec-
tive: government leaders, industry executives, and labor leaders have options 
for how to compete and how to structure their relationships and these choices 
have profound effects on the outcomes of interest to investors, employees, 
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investors, employees, 
customers, and society.12 To be sure, the options chosen have to take account 
of competitive realities, technological changes, and other factors that may be 
outside their control. The task of analysts and decision makers is to under-
stand how external constraints and strategic choices interact to shape the 
outcomes of concern to the different stakeholders. 
Competitive Positions and Strategy 
As we analyze the strategies of selected airlines in the United States and in 
some other countries, we will focus on their employment-relations strategies. 
At a high level, two basic competitive positions can be identified: legacy and 
new-entrant airlines, each of which operates with fairly distinct competitive 
strategies. At a more detailed level, although a range of decisions and dimen-
sions might be relevant to defining competitive strategies, we will focus on 
how airlines achieve cost competitiveness. 
Legacy and New-Entrant Airlines 
Legacies (e.g., American, United, British Airways, Lufthansa, Qantas, and 
SAS) are airlines that were founded long before deregulation and were origi-
nally designed to compete in a regulated environment. Most of the new en-
trants to the industry (e.g., Southwest, AirTran, JetBlue, Ryanair, easyjet, 
and Virgin Blue) were founded in anticipation of or after deregulation, and 
were designed to compete in a less regulated environment. For a number of 
reasons, new entrants tend to have significantly lower costs than legacies— 
hence, they may also be referred to as low-cost airlines. 
First, legacy and new-entrant airlines tend to have distinct product offer-
ings. The legacy airlines have typically been "full service," while most of the 
new-entrant airlines began by featuring "no frills service." "Full service" 
airlines offer a range of amenities, such as flying out of primary airports (which 
are more convenient for many customers), and offering such "frills" as as-
signed seating, several classes of service, airport lounges, in-flight meals, 
drinks, entertainment, and baggage transfers between interconnecting flights. 
Such amenities are seen as important to attracting less price-sensitive busi-
ness travelers. "No frills" airlines forego most of these amenities as a way to 
lower costs and thereby offer lower fares to the more price-sensitive leisure 
travelers that they have targeted, at least initially. 
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Second, legacy airlines develop one or more hubs to maximize destination 
coverage and to defend their markets. Relative to the new entrants, this ap-
proach incurs the costs of higher airport fees as well as greater congestion 
and delays, which reduce aircraft utilization. In addition, this approach re-
quires a more diverse fleet of aircraft to service routes of different density, 
which adds to the costs of maintenance and training. 
The new entrants tend to rely less on hubs and are more likely to operate 
point-to-point route structures instead. They can therefore rely more easily 
on a single aircraft type, increasing aircraft utilization and lowering the costs 
of maintenance and training. 
Third, due to their age, legacy airlines tend to have older employees and 
older aircraft than the new entrants, and the higher costs associated with 
both, such as higher wages due to seniority, higher pension costs, higher re-
tiree health-care benefits, and less fuel-efficient aircraft. Some legacy air-
lines have also accumulated work rules that limit work flexibility and fleets 
that include many types of aircraft acquired in different periods. There is 
more variation in the current age of the newer entrants, however, particu-
larly in the United States where deregulation occurred thirty years ago. 
Southwest Airlines, the oldest in this category, was founded in 1971, while 
JetBlue is one of the youngest, founded only in 2000. Outside the United 
States, Ryanair was founded in 1985 in Ireland, but it was not initially run as 
a low-cost airline; the other new entrants in the rest of the world are much 
younger. 
Strategies for Cost Reduction 
Given that legacy and new-entrant airlines are increasingly competing on 
costs—because of increasing deregulation and the increase in the number 
of new entrant airlines—a second .critical strategic dimension is how they 
choose to be cost competitive. One option is to focus on achieving low labor 
costs by minimizing wages and benefits, keeping staffing as lean as possible, 
and avoiding unionization or limiting union influence if or when employees 
organize. Another option is to focus instead on achieving low total costs by 
increasing employee and aircraft productivity as well as the productivity of 
other costly assets such as airport gates—for example, by speeding up the 
turnaround time of aircraft at the gate. We present Ryanair as the prototype 
new entrant of the former approach and Southwest as a prototype that has 
adopted the latter strategy. Although these are presented as two contrasting 
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Figure 1.1. Competitive strategies. 
or distinct options, in reality most airlines pursue some mixture of the two 
strategies and can be placed somewhere on a continuum between the two 
options. 
Figure 1.1 lays out a simple two-by-two matrix that we will use to classify 
legacy and new-entrant airlines according to which of these two strategies 
dominate their efforts at cost reduction. 
Employment-Relations Strategy 
Alongside these differences in competitive strategies, we analyze differences 
in two aspects of employment-relations strategies. In their relationship with 
employees, airlines can focus either on controlling employee behavior or on 
engaging their commitment to the goals of the airline. In their relationship 
with unions, airlines can seek to avoid, accommodate, or partner with them. 
Both dimensions of employment-relations strategy are depicted in figure 
1.2. 
Control or Commitment 
Airlines and other enterprises have two primary options when it comes to 
managing their employees. Under the control approach, managers specify 
what needs to be done and instruct employees to comply with those direc-
tions.13 The workplace is characterized by a fairly rigid hierarchy and nar-
rowly defined jobs. Employees are expected to come to work and just do 
their job. By contrast, managers following the commitment approach seek to 
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Source: Richard E. Walton, Joel Cutcher-Gershenfeld, and Robert B. McKersie, Strategic 
Negotiations (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1994). 
generate a deeper, more organic relationship between employees and the or-
ganization. Their focus is on engaging employees to understand the interests 
of the enterprise and its customers and to act accordingly. Employees are 
encouraged to be committed to the enterprise and its decisions and in return 
the enterprise promises commitment to the long-term well-being of employ-
ees The commitment approach is usually characterized by greater use of 
teamwork or cross-functional coordination, higher levels of employee discre-
tion, and more flexible job boundaries. 
Avoid, Accommodate, or Partner with Unions 
There are also options when it comes to relations with unions. One option is 
to avoid having employees represented by unions, which can be pursued in 
two ways14 The first is union suppression-voicing strong opposition and ag-
gressively fighting the initial establishment of a union or undermining or 
challenging the existence of an already established union. The second strat-
egy is union substitution-paying high wages and benefits and providing a 
work environment that reduces workers' incentives to, or perception of the 
need to, organize.15 
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Second, rather than avoiding unions, airlines can instead accommodate 
them, which means that they accept—however grudgingly—the basic legiti-
macy and existence of unions, negotiate with them at arm's length, and have 
a contractually based relationship with them. 
A third option is to partner with unions, seeking to establish a broader or 
deeper relationship than is contractually required. Companies and unions 
are engaged in more continuous communication. Unions are brought into 
the decision-making process earlier and on a wider range of issues in an at-
tempt to find mutually acceptable solutions to the challenges that are faced 
by the airline, as opposed to interacting primarily via the negotiation and 
adjudication of the collective bargaining contract. Partnering can be either 
formal or informal. In formal or structural partnerships, unions are involved 
in the governance of the firm, typically through ownership stakes, represen-
tation on the board of directors, or formal consultation processes. In infor-
mal partnerships, unions are involved through consultation or problem-
solving processes that are not built in to the governance structure of the 
airline. 
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Stakeholder Outcomes 
One of our key questions is how do different competitive and employment-
relations strategies induce different outcomes on measures of importance to 
airlines' various stakeholders? What outcome measures are important? For 
airlines and investors, important outcomes include productivity, cost com-
petitiveness (relative unit cost levels), and profitability. For customers, an 
important outcome, in addition to price, is service quality. 
It is important to recognize three distinct dimensions of service quality. 
One dimension involves the level of amenities or "frills," as mentioned above 
(e.g., assigned seats, free meals, first class, and so forth). A second dimension 
is "reliability," particularly an airline's on-time and lost baggage performance. 
The third dimension is "friendliness": how an airline's staff—on the phone, 
on the ground, in the air—interacts with customers. These quality distinc-
tions are achieved in different ways. Amenities can be imitated via additional 
investments and higher costs, whereas reliability and friendliness do not 
necessarily require higher costs but instead stem from superior operational 
coordination and workforce motivation. Airlines that rate highly on one di-
mension will not automatically rate highly on the other two. We keep these 
distinctions in mind in our analyses. 
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For employees, important outcomes include income levels, employment 
security, morale, and job satisfaction. This is linked to the idea of human re-
source advantage and the burgeoning literature on people (employees) as a 
source of competitive advantage.16 Some potential sources of competitive 
advantage (e.g., new planes) can be fairly easily replicated via capital invest-
ment, whereas others, such as the reliability or "friendliness" of customer 
service, cannot be so easily replicated (e.g., will staff use their initiative or 
"run the extra mile" to help to solve problems that might not always be easily 
predictable or programmed).17 
What's to Come 
In the chapters that follow, we explore the competitive strategies and 
employment-relations strategies found in the United States (chapter 2) and 
in a range of other countries (chapter 3), before and after deregulation. In 
chapter 4 we analyze recent trends in quality, productivity, and costs, as well 
as employee outcomes. In chapter 5 we look more closely at selected 
new-entrant airlines and find a wide range of competitive and employment-
relations strategies being used in this segment of the industry. In chapter 6, 
we examine several legacy airlines and identify the distinct strategies they 
have adopted to respond to competitive pressures from new-entrant airlines. 
These chapters each focus on selected U.S. airlines and those based in some 
other countries. In chapter 7, we summarize the strategies of new-entrant 
and legacy airlines, and offer lessons about how airlines can and do change 
their strategies over time in their efforts to compete more effectively. 
We offer recommendations, using our historical and comparative analyses 
to discuss whether a path forward can be identified that can provide a better 
balance in stakeholder outcomes. We end on a positive note, arguing that if 
the parties learn from their experiences and from each other, in the United 
States and other countries, there is a path that deals with the pressures 
building up in the airline industry, offering hope for a better balance be-
tween investor, employee, customer, and societal interests. Key questions are 
whether and from where the leadership will come to get the industry moving 
down this path or whether the main parties might not take such action be-
fore there is a "perfect storm." 
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Labor relations in the U.S. airline industry have often been a high-stakes 
enterprise. The national interest in airlines was recognized in the 1930s just 
as the industry was getting off the ground. After lobbying by the Air Line 
Pilots Association (ALPA), in 1936 the federal government brought airlines 
under the same labor law, the Railway Labor Act (RLA), that governs rail-
roads, the other large transportation sector deemed worthy of national labor 
regulation. Thus the basic structure of labor relations in U.S. airlines was 
born. This structure came to be known as "class and craft" to signify that 
each occupational group—pilots, flight attendants, mechanics, customer 
service agents, and so forth—would have its own union and that each airline 
would negotiate separate agreements with each group. Under this law work-
ers have the right to strike, but only after the government has provided me-
diation and only after other efforts to reach agreement have failed. The bar-
gaining process under the RLA is described here: 
Negotiating in the U.S. Airline Industry 
Labor agreements in the U.S. airline industry do not have fixed expiration dates. In-
stead, they have "amendable" dates. After the amendable date, the provisions of the ex-
isting contract remain in effect until the parties reach a new agreement or until they have 
exhausted the provisions of the Railway Labor Act. New contract terms cannot be 
16 Up in the Air 
imposed unilaterally and strikes or lockouts cannot be initiated until the parties have pro-
gressed through several steps that are regulated by the National Mediation Board (NMB). 
If the parties cannot reach a contract agreement on their own through direct negoti-
ations, either side may then apply for mediation services from the NMB. Once in media-
tion, negotiations continue until an agreement is reached or until the NMB declares an 
impasse. At that point, the NMB offers the option of entering into binding arbitration. If 
either party rejects the offer of arbitration, the NMB "releases" the parties. Once re-
leased, the parties then enter a thirty-day "cooling-off period," during which time the 
existing contract provisions remain in effect. At the end of the cooling-off period, if the 
parties still have not reached an agreement, the NMB chooses whether to let the parties 
engage in "seif-help"—that is, a strike by workers or a lockout or unilateral imposition of 
new contract terms by management-or recommend that the president create a Presi-
dential Emergency Board (PEB). The PEB, composed of three neutral experts, is al-
lowed thirty days to deliberate and formulate a recommended settlement. After the PEB 
issues its recommendations, another thirty-day cooling-off period begins. Finally, at the 
end of the second cooling-off period, the parties are free to engage in self-help. As a fi-
nal recourse, after the expiration of the second cooling-off period, the president can re-
fer the case to Congress. Congress has the authority to legislate a settlement if it cannot 
get the parties to resolve the dispute by other means. 
At the same time, Congress sought stability by bringing the airline indus-
try under the authority of the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB), which regu-
lated the entry of new airlines, the routes individual airlines could fly, and 
the prices on all routes. Regulation was motivated by the destructive price 
wars that had occurred between large airlines in the early 1930s. But regula-
tion was also motivated by the belief that airlines served two critical national 
interests—to provide reliable, safe transportation and to provide help to the 
nation in times of war or other crises. 
From the 1930s to the end of the regulatory period in 1978 the airline 
industry expanded steadily. Just before deregulation, fourteen large airlines, 
classified as "major airlines" by the Department of Transportation, domi-
nated the U.S. market, with another twenty-three smaller airlines serving 
various regional markets. By 1978, passengers were flying approximately 275 
million miles per year. Unions grew significantly from the 1930s to 1978. At 
the time of deregulation unions represented about 45 percent of the work-
force and more than 60 percent of the nonmanagerial workforce. Labor rela-
tions in the airline industry were similar to labor relations in other large-scale 
industries at that time. Wages and working conditions were governed by 
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collectively bargained labor contracts that became filled with comprehen-
sive and complex work rules.1 The relationship between airlines and their 
employees was generally at arm's length, heavily regulated by these con-
tracts. Altogether, the airlines of that era fit into the control/accommodation 
employment-relations categories (see figure 1.2). 
Though wages were set through firm-by-firm, craft-by-craft negotiations, 
cross-firm wage standardization was achieved through pattern bargaining. 
After one major union-airline pair reached an agreement, negotiators at other 
airlines felt pressure to match it. Because the Civil Aeronautics Board passed 
wage increases on to consumers by granting price increases, pattern bar-
gaining worked both for unions and for airlines. 
Negotiations were not always harmonious. In 1958 management sought to 
strengthen its hand in bargaining by forming a "Mutual Aid Pact" in which 
airlines that gained revenue from increased business because of a strike at 
another airline would share that revenue with the airline suffering the strike. 
Northwest Airlines took the prize for collecting the most from this Mutual 
Aid Pact (Eastern Airlines was second) because it had the worst strike record 
of all major airlines before the Mutual Aid Pact was abolished in 1978 under 
deregulation. Thus ended the first major effort at industry solidarity in re-
sponse to union bargaining power. 
How did the large airlines compete before deregulation? Since they could 
not control prices and had only limited flexibility in choosing routes and even 
less unilateral discretion in abandoning routes that proved to be unprofit-
able, they attempted to differentiate on the basis of service quality and econo-
mies of scale. 
With a few exceptions, there was little effort to turn employment relations 
or human resources into sources of competitive advantage. Among the legacy 
airlines, Delta Airlines was the major exception. Delta's historic approach to 
employee and labor relations involved an implicit commitment to high wages, 
lifetime employment, and a "family" culture with the intention of substituting 
for union representation and inducing high levels of service from its employ-
ees. Delta followed a commitment/avoidance employment-relations strategy 
(figure 1.2). For a long time, this approach helped Delta maintain a reputation 
for delivering high-quality service. Delta's approach also discouraged all em-
ployees except its pilots and dispatchers from unionizing. In addition to Delta, 
two new-entrant firms attempted to turn employment relations into a source 
of strategic advantage—Pacific Southwest Airlines (PSA) and Southwest Air-
lines. PSA was founded in 1949 and Southwest began operations in 1971, 
both as small intrastate operations in California and Texas, respectively. Both 
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